

THE STRUGGLE FOR  
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP IN INDIANA, 1954

Frank Munger

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## THE POLITICS OF PATRONAGE

The post from which Noland Wright had been so unceremoniously removed was that of chairman of the Republican State Central Committee. Under the provisions of the Indiana election law, Wright had been directly elected

to that position by the members of the state committee, and indirectly by the entire number of enrolled party members in the state. The Indiana structure of party committees formed a neat pyramid. In the primary election held the first Tuesday after the first Monday in May in even-numbered years, the registered party members in each precinct were eligible to vote for one precinct committeeman. (There were 4,341 precincts in the state in 1954.) The elected committeeman was then entitled to designate a precinct vice-committeeman, required to be "of opposite sex." The precinct committeemen and vice-committeemen together make up the party county committee and elected the county chairman and vice-chairman. The county chairmen and vice-chairmen from each county within a congressional district (there were eleven congressional districts in Indiana in 1954) made up the party's district committee and elected, in turn, a district chairman and vice-chairman. The 22 district chairmen and vice-chairmen from across the state then constituted the state committee.

In the highly professionalized politics of Indiana this pyramid of party power was closely tied to the distribution of patronage. Despite the inroads made by the application of the Hatch Act to state employees in programs subsidized by federal grants-in-aid, and the transfer of state penal and institutional employees to civil service, a majority of the positions in the Indiana state government were still distributed to party workers in return for services rendered. The state committee apportioned these patronage jobs among the district chairmen; the district chairmen in turn divided them among their county chairmen. The more important positions were taken either by the district or county chairmen themselves; the less important positions were distributed by the county chairman as he thought most suitable. In addition, of course, county party organizations had the disposition of city and county patronage in the local governments they controlled.

Indiana differed from most other states, however, in that a second set of party officials was elected simultaneously with the precinct committeemen. These were the delegates to the state nominating convention. Party candidates for statewide office in Indiana were selected not by the party voters in primary elections but by convention delegates, elected in the May primary, at a subsequent convention. In this use of a state party convention to nominate statewide candidates for office, Indiana resembled a pattern once universal among the states and still perpetuated at the national level, but continued for top state offices only in New York, Delaware, and Indiana.

As might be anticipated, the two hierarchies of party officials were closely related; the slate of delegates for the state convention from each county was ordinarily prepared by the party's county chairman and the county chairman traditionally served as the chairman of his county's delegation to the convention. A reform of the election law adopted in 1947, however, limited the extent to which the chairman could control the delegates from his county. In a unique procedure the convention delegates were directed to vote in secret by means of voting machines. When the time came to vote on each office before the convention, the machines were prepared, the delegates filed in groups to their assigned voting machines and, in a procedure very similar to that followed by an ordinary voter in a general election, the delegate cast

his ballot in secret for the candidate of his choice. Many delegates still followed the advice of their county chairmen in voting; if they preferred, however, they could vote as they pleased.

The struggle to control the Republican party in Indiana involved both sets of party officials. Although the 1954 conflict concerned primarily the party organization proper—the county, district, and state committees—it found its roots in the 1952 state convention. At that gathering George Craig, a political outsider, won the nomination for governor over the opposition of the regular Republican organization and its leader, Senator Capehart. Any reasonably comprehensive account of the 1954 Republican war must begin with that event.

### EISENHOWER-TAFT SPLIT

The campaign for the 1952 Republican convention nomination for governor began on January 10 of that year when Senator William E. Jenner announced that he would not be a candidate for governor, but would seek renomination to the Senate. The announcement came as a surprise to many; for he had sought the gubernatorial nomination at the conventions of 1940 and 1948 and had been beaten only narrowly in the latter year. The defeat in the 1948 general election of the convention choice, Hobart Creighton, had strengthened Jenner's hold on the organization and opened the way for a 1952 nomination.

Jenner's withdrawal turned the race for nomination for governor into a wide-open scramble. It did not alter, however, the firm hold of Senator Jenner and his allies upon the party organization. Jenner, together with Senator Homer E. Capehart and Republican State Chairman Cale J. Holder, retained control of the state committee. In the preconvention campaign this combination devoted itself to two principal purposes: the nomination of a friendly candidate for governor and the selection of a slate of delegates to the national party convention that could be counted upon to support Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio for the presidential nomination.

Despite their reputation for belonging to the right wing of their party, Indiana Republicans had done badly by Senator Taft. In 1940 he had received some support from the Indiana delegation at the national convention, but the delegation was divided by the claims of other candidates and the favorite-son nomination of Wendell Willkie, who received the largest share of the state's convention votes. In 1948 Governor Ralph F. Gates had gone to the presidential nominating convention as a supporter of Taft, with hopes of swinging most or all of the Indiana delegates to Taft by the third or fourth ballot. But Representative Charles A. Halleck believed that he had a promise from Thomas E. Dewey's managers that if Indiana went solidly for the New York governor on the first ballot, Halleck would be given the vice-presidential nomination. At a secret caucus the delegation reluctantly agreed to give Halleck the chance but, though Dewey received the nomination, Halleck did not obtain his expected reward.

The Republican regulars, united in 1952 behind Taft, were determined there would be no similar slip-ups at the convention and devoted their

efforts to securing an all-Taft delegation. When the 2,116 delegates to the state convention were elected at the May party primary, most contests that took place were fought out on a Taft-Eisenhower basis. Only a minority of the elections of delegates, however, actually involved two or more candidates for one post, and these contests were located principally in the big city counties. Few turned upon the races for governor and other state offices. The strongest showing of the forces supporting General Dwight Eisenhower for president was made in Marion County (which includes Indianapolis, the largest city in the state) where the Citizens for Eisenhower organization was most active and filed almost a full slate of convention delegates. The filing of Eisenhower candidates for the state convention was facilitated by the fact that H. Dale Brown, the county clerk, had been an Eisenhower advocate since September, 1950.

Shortly before the primary the Taft-controlled Republican state committee advanced the convention meeting date from July 3 to June 7. Eisenhower supporters charged that the committee was trying to head off a popular swing to the General, but the state chairman insisted the change was necessary to accord with national convention rules. The primary elections went generally in favor of the organization-Taft candidates; the only major success for the Eisenhower forces came in Indianapolis, where they claimed to have elected 168 of the 296 delegates from Marion County. Cale Holder was retained as state chairman in the party reorganization that followed the primary.

### THE GUBERNATORIAL ASPIRANTS

After each county had chosen its convention delegates in the primary, efforts were made by the leading candidates for governor to line up support. The most active pre-convention campaign was conducted by George Craig, then a 42-year-old Indianapolis attorney. A former national commander of the American Legion with a good World War II record, Craig had personal contacts in every county through the Legion organization. He campaigned energetically across the state, delivering speeches on what he considered to be the issues of the election, such as mental health and highways. Public opinion polls indicated he had the most popular support of all the candidates, and even many delegates who opposed him conceded that Craig would be the most potent vote-getter in the general election.

Craig was the only one of the candidates for governor to support Eisenhower; although he concentrated on his own race and did not take an active part in the campaign for Eisenhower delegates. He, in turn, was generally favored by the Eisenhower delegate group. In part for this reason and even more because his independent strength made him potentially uncontrollable and unreliable as governor, the regular organization opposed Craig's nomination. Capehart was the center of the opposition to Craig; Jenner, whose Senate term was expiring, was more concerned with securing his own renomination. Capehart, Holder, and their allies did not select any one candidate to oppose Craig; organization strength was dispersed among several candidates.

Next to Craig the strongest candidate in the pre-convention maneuvers

was Leland Smith of Logansport, Indiana secretary of state and Second District Republican chairman. As secretary of state, Smith controlled the auto license bureaus, a basic item of political patronage that assured him a following across the state. Under Indiana law, motor vehicle and drivers' licenses were sold by agencies operating under contract with the state government. The permitted profit was substantial and the contract was usually given to a local leader of the dominant party, usually the county chairman. One county chairman explained his position at the 1952 convention thus: "I don't try to control how my delegates vote at the convention. But I had this job here [in the license bureau] which I got from Leland Smith, so I went along with him myself. Some of the boys came to me and said: 'Whatever you say, we'll go along.' So I told them, vote for whoever you like, but I think we ought to give Leland Smith some votes."

Smith was handicapped, however, by a division of forces within his own district. John W. Van Ness of Valparaiso, also in the Second District and president of the State Senate, was likewise a candidate for governor. The Fourth Congressional District similarly provided two candidates for governor, W. O. Hughes of Fort Wayne, speaker of the Indiana House of Representatives, and Francis T. McCarty, a Brimfield industrialist. The other major candidate was Samuel Harrell, a Noblesville businessman favored by the organization. A seventh candidate for governor, Herbert W. Lane, could not be described as a serious contender.

## THE STATE CONVENTION

The last few days before the convention were filled with rumors, predictions of victory by the candidates, and attempts to gain last minute tactical advantages. The two most commonly reported rumors were that a coalition of independent candidates would be formed to unite against the candidates allegedly slated for office by the state committee and that Craig and Smith were negotiating an alliance that would predetermine the nomination for governor. When State Chairman Holder announced that "package" voting would be used to make the convention nominations, a howl of protest went up, particularly from the Craig camp. A 1951 amendment to the convention law had given the parties the option of voting on the offices one by one or package voting, placing all the candidates for contested offices on one ballot and disposing of them simultaneously. The choice of voting procedure was left to the discretion of the state chairman. When Holder chose the package system of voting, the objections were raised that it would limit the opportunity to balance the ticket, be too complicated and confusing, and encourage quick, behind-the-scene deals. Specifically, anti-organization delegates feared that Holder and Capehart planned to use the package vote to jam through on one vote a slate of candidates for each office. Nominations for twelve statewide elective offices were to be made, and of these seven were contested.

Factional fighting began at the district meetings, held the night before the convention. District delegates to the national convention were selected at caucuses of the state convention delegates from each congressional district. Only the delegates-at-large were to be chosen by the convention as a whole.

The Taft-Eisenhower contest, therefore, was fought out in these district meetings.

The Taft-allied state party leaders had chosen to make use of the filing procedure to secure an all-Taft delegation. Convention rules of both major parties in Indiana required that candidates for nomination pay a filing fee before their names go to the convention for consideration. At the 1952 Republican convention all candidates for national delegate were required by the state chairman to pay the \$500 assessment before the meeting of the district caucuses, although the Eisenhower managers insisted the previous custom had been not to require candidates for delegate to file in advance. When, in addition, Holder refused to accept filing papers and fees from several independent candidates for delegate on the ground that they appeared after the deadline, Robert A. Grant, state chairman of the Eisenhower campaign organization, charged they had been locked out until after the deadline and threatened a contest at the national convention. One of the candidates whose papers were refused was Congressman Halleck.

Only two nominations for national delegate—the number to be elected—were approved for each district. In the Eleventh District (Indianapolis) the slated delegates were pledged to Eisenhower; everywhere else the organization had accepted filing papers only from committed Taft delegates. One district, the Tenth, refused to accept the state committee slate and the caucus substituted its own candidate in place of one of the approved names; the delegate substituted was, however, also pledged to Taft. Everywhere else the slated candidates were accepted, but noisy protests were made in the Eleventh District caucus, which had been assigned Eisenhower delegates but not those favored by the Citizens for Eisenhower group.

#### THE "LONG COUNT"

Fighting was resumed the next day at the convention itself. Senator Capehart served as permanent chairman. A few boos were heard as he was presented. After the names of the delegates to the national convention had been read, Capehart promptly recognized Delegate Frederick Schortemeier, a former secretary of state, already on the platform. Schortemeier read a motion instructing the entire Indiana delegation to cast its vote for Robert A. Taft at the Chicago convention. Capehart immediately called for a voice vote and then ruled that the motion had passed. A roar of disapproval greeted this announcement. Catcalls and boos also greeted Cale Holder's announcement that a package system of voting would be used. Several candidates for office, including Senator Jenner, were next nominated without opposition. The delegates then filed to the 37 voting machines to cast their votes on the seven contested offices. They impatiently awaited the "long count" in the sweltering hot convention hall; a restless two hours and 40 minutes later the results of the first ballot were tabulated and announced.

The first ballot settled the five minor offices by majority votes: secretary of state, superintendent of public instruction, Supreme Court justice, court reporter, and judge of the Appellate Court for the Northern (Second) District. Only two contests were left undecided, lieutenant governor and governor; in

these no candidate had a majority. Four candidates had filed in the former race. Harold W. Handley of LaPorte, who had campaigned for governor and then withdrawn to seek the nomination for lieutenant governor instead, was regarded as the organization candidate. He led slightly on the first ballot, winning 823 votes (40.3 percent) to 791 (38.8 percent for State Treasurer William L. Fortune of Hamilton County, the leading independent candidate. Two other candidates, Milford E. Anness of Liberty and Kenneth F. Blackwell of Franklin, showed only local and regional strength.


But the focus of interest was the all-important race for governor. Here the first ballot was indecisive. Craig led as expected, receiving the votes of 32.9 percent of the delegates. Smith followed in second place with 22.7 percent. The other candidates trailed: Harrell, 17.1; Van Ness, 16.4; Hughes, 8.3; McCarty, 2.5; Lane, 0.2. Only the four leaders had strength across the state. The vote for Hughes—and for McCarty—came almost exclusively from the Fourth Congressional District in the northeast corner of the state where both lived. Craig was relatively weak in the northern end of the state; his strength lay in the south—with the exception of the southern Eighth Congressional District where the Evansville organization was backing Smith—and in Marion County, the Eleventh. The Eleventh, in which he was then residing, and the Seventh District in southern Indiana, including his former home at Brazil, gave Craig his largest pluralities.

## GUBERNATORIAL CONTEST

The second ballot settled the nomination for lieutenant governor. Anness and Blackwell dropped almost entirely out of the race, Fortune gained only slightly, and Handley swept on to win the nomination with 55.3 percent of the votes. Craig continued to gain on the second ballot for governor, but remained considerably short of a majority with 40.6 percent of the vote. Smith also moved ahead on this ballot, but not so rapidly as Craig. Both Harrell and Van Ness lost strength. Smith's biggest gains came at their expense in the industrial First Congressional District, including the factory area around Gary, where the county chairman was friendly to Capehart. By this ballot Craig was receiving a majority of the vote in six of the eleven congressional districts, but was held back from a convention majority by opposition from the four northernmost districts and Evansville.

After the second ballot it was apparent that only Craig or Smith could win; Harrell and Van Ness had been eliminated by their weakness in the second vote. Newspapermen observed a huddle on the floor between Smith, Van Ness, and Harrell, but Smith walked away. An attempt was made to negotiate a coalition against Craig, but Smith declined to make the necessary promises and the plan fell through. In any case Tom Bath, the leader of St. Joseph County (South Bend) and friendly to both Craig and Smith, had already determined to throw his county's substantial strength to Craig. When this switch became known to the delegates and the Evansville organization followed suit, other delegations started to jump on the bandwagon. As the voting began the word spread that Craig was in. Even before the count was completed he was escorted to the speakers' platform by a wildly en-

**INDIANA**  
 Congressional Districts, Counties and Selected Cities  
 (11 Districts)



thusiastic collection of bandwagon riders, many waving district or county signs.

The final ballot was a landslide for Craig who received over two-thirds of the votes of the convention delegates. Only Leland Smith held strength against him. A scattering of delegates voted for Harrell and all other candidates were effectively eliminated. Smith actually gained votes on the last ballot in two northern districts—the Second and the Fourth—as Van Ness and Hughes released their delegates, and he again carried the First, but lost heavily in the Third and Eighth as the South Bend and Evansville organizations turned to Craig. The final pattern of the vote clearly demonstrated its sectional character. Craig, from Brazil and Indianapolis, was the only candidate in the race from the southern half of the state. Harrell, Van Ness, Smith, Hughes, and McCarty were all from the area to the north of the National Road (US 40), the traditional sectional dividing line in Indiana. (See map.) Craig swept the southern regions; the only two voting machines in the sections of the floor assigned to the southern counties which gave him less than 75 percent of the vote on the final ballot were those at which delegates from Daviess County (Capehart's home) and Lawrence County (Jenner's home) voted. The only northern machines which recorded equally strong Craig support were those assigned to Tom Bath's St. Joseph County delegation.

### **ORGANIZATION DEFEAT**

The regular organization had not been entirely defeated at the convention. Senator Jenner had been renominated, and the great majority of the candidates for lesser offices were sympathetic to Capehart and Jenner. This included the candidate for lieutenant governor, Harold Handley, who, if the common practice were followed, would become the candidate for governor four years later.

Yet the regulars, despite their control of the state committee, had lost the most important nomination, that for governor. This failure can be attributed both to Craig's individual strength and to the inability of his opponents to unite. None of the other candidates for governor—though Smith came closest to it—had the kind of statewide following that Craig had built up through his Legion connections; each was confined to effective support in only a few districts. In addition the organization had chosen the dangerous strategy of scattering support among several candidates, only to find at the convention it had succeeded too well. Each man was convinced he should be the final choice and would not give way to a coalition candidate until it was too late.

### **CRAIG STRIKES BACK**

The organization had failed in its efforts to prevent Craig's nomination; that it had made the attempt was enough to assure Craig's hostility. Such internal party squabbles were usually adjusted and compromised in the months following the convention—during the campaign or, less frequently, after the election. In the case of Craig, Capehart, and Jenner, however, time did not heal. The regulars, still in control of the party organization, kept

Cale Holder in as state chairman. At a meeting of the state committee called immediately after the convention, Ralph F. Gates, allied with Senators Jenner and Capehart despite earlier conflicts, was reelected national committeeman. He was unsuccessfully opposed by Craig's political friend, Tom Bath, who was nominated by Leland Smith. Gates received 14 of the possible 22 votes. If Craig had been defeated for governor, the hold of the regulars on the party would have remained secure. But Craig was elected, and by a considerably larger majority than that given the candidate for United States Senator, William Jenner. With his victory Craig won control of the state patronage that ordinarily oiled the party machinery.

After his election and before taking office, Craig struck back at his enemies in the party. He announced that he would transfer the Bureau of Motor Vehicles from the control of the secretary of state, a regular, to the governor's office. The transfer was justified as contributing to "traffic safety," one of Craig's campaign promises, but it found its significance in the importance of the bureau's patronage to the party's functioning. By his act Craig secured personal control of the distribution of the county license bureaus.

### **WRIGHT BECOMES CHAIRMAN**

Holder resigned as state chairman after the general election and Craig was permitted to name his successor. He chose Mayor Noland Wright of Anderson, one of the Craig managers at the 1952 convention. But Wright's tenure as chairman was clearly dependent upon the continuing consent of the two Senators and National Committeeman Ralph Gates who, collectively, still controlled a majority on the state committee. The hostilities within the party continued as Craig decided to "by-pass" certain district and county chairmen in the distribution of patronage. In these areas state jobs were not passed out through the officers of the regular organization as was customary; instead they were handed out through individuals designated by Craig and presumably personally loyal to him. At the state level the distribution of patronage was supervised by the governor's administrative assistant, William Sayer, one of Craig's friends from the American Legion.

One of the first to be by-passed by Governor Craig was Vernon Anderson, the First District chairman who had held out to the last against him at the 1952 convention. Later other names were added to the prohibited list until five district chairmen and numerous county chairmen were being officially ignored. Late in 1953 the governor's office announced that patronage allocation had been returned to the state committee. A method for distributing it was also suggested to State Chairman Wright—to continue to by-pass those previously by-passed.

The intra-party conflict intensified through the 1953 legislative session. Craig's program for legislative action ran into strong opposition, and much of his proposed legislation was blocked by a group of powerful state senators at least loosely connected with the Capehart-Jenner alliance. An open battle between the two factions occurred late in the year when Milton H. Fitzgerald, Seventh District Republican chairman, a Capehart ally, was fatally

injured in an automobile accident. Craig put up a candidate to replace him who was beaten badly. The governor came closer to success when he sought to elect a friendly state committeeman in Fitzgerald's place. Bruce Kixmiller was elected by only two votes, 12 to 10, over Craig's candidate, James Ringer. Other minor skirmishes took place as the two groups struggled for political advantage in party reorganizations. An election of a new county chairman in Gibson County, also in the Seventh District, produced charges of procedural irregularities from Craig's group and of attempted bribery from Kixmiller.

### CRAIG-CAPEHART MEETING

Predictions had been circulating that Wright would soon be ousted, sometime before the primaries in May, 1954. Early in January the conflict reached the action stage. Craig and Capehart sought to reach an agreement to reduce party friction. A bedside conference was held in Washington with Craig and Senator Jenner in attendance upon Capehart, who was confined for high blood pressure. Capehart demanded: 1) A new state chairman, that is, one recognized by the rank and file as a Capehart-Jenner man. 2) The end of patronage by-passing. 3) All state and federal patronage to be cleared through county and district chairmen. 4) A veto by the chairmen over patronage already distributed in their areas. 5) All future patronage to be cleared through the new state chairman.

The proposals, if accepted, would have permitted the by-passed party chairmen to screen all state appointments made by the Craig forces and dismiss all those unacceptable to them. Acceptance of the proposals would have ended Craig's efforts to build up a personal following within the party organization. In the background of the dispute was the 1956 state convention and 1956 election. Craig's term would be up at that time; so would Capehart's. Craig was constitutionally ineligible to serve a second term; if he wished to continue in politics the logical step would be to seek the party nomination for United States Senator against Capehart. If Craig wished to continue to play a major role within the party, it would be necessary for him to control the nomination of his successor as governor.

No agreement was reached. Craig returned to Indianapolis. At this point in the negotiations the Fort Wayne *News-Sentinel* published a story asserting that State Supreme Court Judge Dan C. Flanagan of Fort Wayne, 1952 head of the Citizens for Eisenhower Committee, would probably be made state chairman as a result of agreements reached by Craig and the Senators. Flanagan was quoted as saying he would be glad to serve as a harmony candidate, but all three principals denied the story. Senator Capehart arrived in Indianapolis Thursday, January 28. He immediately began conferences with various members of the state committee. A special meeting of the state committee to discuss agricultural policy in relation to the forthcoming congressional elections was scheduled for Saturday, January 30. Capehart, Jenner, and Gates reached agreement that at that time Noland Wright would be removed.

### WRIGHT IS REMOVED

At the January 30 meeting, 21 of the 22 state committee members were present, in person or by proxy. Only Leland Smith, Second District chairman, was absent. Immediately after the committee was called to order a motion was offered to suspend the rules and elect officers. It was passed without opposition as the pro-Craig members sat silent. A motion was then offered to vacate the offices of chairman and vice-chairman. This passed 14 to 5 with two abstentions. Wright and Vice-Chairman Mrs. Mabel E. Lyons were out. Vernon Anderson then moved that Paul Cyr, a deputy secretary of state, be elected state chairman. The motion was approved without opposition. Mrs. Martha Whitehead, Tenth District vice-chairman, was elected state vice-chairman. A few minutes later, Wright's resignation "in the interest of statewide party harmony" and Cyr's election as his successor were announced to the waiting newsmen.

Charges and counter-charges followed. Governor Craig, just returning home from a speech he had made in Topeka, Kansas, declared: "I knew nothing about it. I'm greatly surprised. I arrived home after it was all over. I've always hoped for party harmony. The Republican party is entitled to it. . . . A political maneuver of this kind doesn't help it. In the words of the French, it was a *coup d'etat*." Jenner and Capehart, on the other hand, were surrounded by party leaders offering congratulations. Some committee members professed to believe that Craig had been planning to make Flanagan state chairman. Wright's explanation of the ouster placed the blame on Capehart, asserting that Jenner and Craig had been about to reach a harmonious understanding. "Capehart didn't want Jenner and Craig to work together. So he stopped it with his chairmanship maneuvering. All the advance work was done by Capehart. He is the man who pulled the trigger on me." A reporter for the *Indianapolis Star* wrote: "Practically all the members of the committee were convinced they had been double-crossed, the only difference of opinion being as to who had done it."

The removal of Wright was not too surprising, although the timing of the move startled many. Cyr's election was apparently arranged for its effect on the election of precinct committeemen in the May primary. By proving their power within the party, the Capehart-Jenner group hoped to influence the precinct elections favorably. If Wright had been left in, some local party members might have questioned whether the Senators actually controlled a majority vote in the state committee. And if the precinct elections were lost, the whole structure of party organization control would fall with them as the results were communicated, step by step, up the party pyramid.

The timing of the ouster, however, contributed to a belief that the Senators had jumped Craig when he wasn't looking. The selection of Cyr was also unexpected; he was relatively unknown in the state, his chief political claim being an unsuccessful campaign for Congress in the heavily Democratic First District in 1950 when he ran a surprisingly strong race. Cyr had handled publicity for Jenner in his campaign for reelection as Senator. At the time of his election he was deputy to Secretary of State Crawford F. Parker, an ally of the

Senatorial group. Cyr was relatively inexperienced politically and only 32 years old.

### GESTURES TOWARD "HARMONY"

A few futile attempts were made at "harmony." Cyr promised that the state organization would make no effort to punish Craig candidates, would keep out of primary fights, and support whatever candidates were nominated. But when Cyr went to the statehouse and began holding informal meetings in each office, Craig promptly described the meetings as a waste of public money and ordered that they stop. When Cyr sought to confer with the governor, Craig's aides informed him the first open date for an appointment would be February 17, two weeks off. The new state chairman went to Washington, met the President, held a joint press conference with Capehart, Jenner, and Gates, and attended a "harmony" luncheon with the Indiana congressional delegation. One congressman commented: "It really wasn't much of a harmony meeting. Not a blow was struck."

Craig, in turn, charged Cyr with "bad politics and bad manners." Of Capehart's peace proposals he said: "They remind me of Molotov's conditions for a Big Four conference, and I am sure they were offered with the same degree of sincerity." When the new state chairman circulated among party workers an open letter to the governor, charging that Craig had appointed Democrats to non-merit state positions and that Craig's personal secretary "has voted Democrat for years," the governor accused him of "political adolescence and immaturity" for encouraging party fratricide that might contribute to Republican defeat in the fall. But Craig's counter-attack upon his enemies within the Republican party took tangible shape February 10 with the announcement of the formation of the Indiana Committee for Republican Victory. The chairman of the new organization, Fred C. Tucker, Jr., described it as "supplemental" to the Republican State Committee and declared: "It will be the purpose of the Indiana Committee for Republican Victory to give financial and other support to all Republican candidates named in the primary election and the state convention of the party." It was indicated also that the "voluntary contributions" of state employees would be welcomed.

### AN OLD POLITICAL CUSTOM

The meaning of these veiled statements was clear to those concerned. By Indiana political custom state employees ordinarily contributed two percent of their annual salaries—one week's pay—to the party treasury. This year they were expected to direct their contributions to a separate Craig-sponsored organization. The money thus obtained would be used to finance a campaign to elect precinct committeemen friendly to Craig, county chairmen friendly to Craig, district chairmen friendly to Craig, and ultimately a state chairman friendly to Craig.

Lieutenant Governor Handley, Secretary of State Parker, Superintendent of Public Instruction Wilbur Young, State Treasurer John Peters, and Attorney General Edwin Steers replied with announcements that their employees would

continue to pay assessments to the state committee. Most state employees, however, were in departments under Craig's control, particularly the conservation and highways departments. The *Indianapolis Star* estimated that the Indiana Committee for Republican Victory, Craig's committee, could expect about \$200,000 from employee assessments. A strict application of the two percent rule to the 6,400 patronage employees would have netted a total in the neighborhood of \$250,000, but Craig had ruled that contributions of this size were too much to expect from the lower paid employees. The state committee was not left financially helpless in the struggle; in addition to the assessments on employees in the departments of friendly state officials, it entered the year with a surplus of \$180,000. Furthermore, some state employees, playing it safe, made contributions of two percent to each of the two factions.

With the formation of the Indiana Committee for Republican Victory Governor Craig had launched a calculated drive to regain control of the party organization. Attempts had been made before to capture the party machinery from the incumbents; the Democrats had gone through one such struggle in 1948 when former Governor Schricker and State Chairman Pleas Greenlee were fighting for control. Rarely, if ever, however, had a factional campaign been waged on so extensive a scale. Ordinarily, a few counties might witness fights for precinct committeemen in attempts to control the election of county chairman; the bulk of the maneuvering would consist of efforts to line up other county chairmen and, later, district chairmen. Craig, upon the advice of his political associates, William Sayer, Elmer Sherwood, and others, proposed to use the money raised from assessments on state employees to wage the fight in the precincts over most of the state.

### FACTIONAL WARFARE

This was the basis for the struggle that convulsed the Republican party in Indiana in the months that followed. Craig's allies in the battle were in considerable part—though with significant exceptions—his allies in the 1952 convention. The division between Taft and Eisenhower tended to repeat itself in the 1954 struggle between the two Senators and Craig, but both sides now sought to tie themselves to the magical Eisenhower name. Craig's 1954 leader in Marion County was H. Dale Brown, an Eisenhower leader there in 1952. Craig had the support also of the group that had supported him in his rise in the American Legion; both Sayer and Sherwood were Legion associates. And many others allied themselves with Craig because the alliance promised to enhance their own personal share of political power. Certainly, it would be difficult to detect consistent ideological differences between the factions; more significant was the tendency of certain groups of individuals who had worked together successfully in the past to look again to old political friends when war portended.

Actually, the 1954 line of battle showed some resemblance to the combination at the 1948 state convention that had operated to block Jenner's bid for nomination as governor. Such men as Tom Bath, the St. Joseph County chairman, Walter E. Helmke of Fort Wayne, State Senator Roy Conrad of Monticello, and others were notable in both coalitions. The most substantial loss from

the 1948 anti-Jenner group was Ralph Gates, then governor, in 1954 national committeeman, and allied with Jenner and Capehart. In his struggle Craig had with him only one other elected state official, Auditor Frank Millis. Millis' support was vital, however, both through his personal political acumen and through his official position on the State Revenue Commission. Together the governor, auditor, and treasurer constituted this commission, perhaps the most important single unit within the state government. With either the auditor or the treasurer on his side, the governor could maintain control; if both were against him he would be outvoted and would lose effective control of the state's fiscal machinery.

Although Craig's support on the top levels of party leadership resembled his support in 1952, his position in the state committee sharply contrasted with his delegate strength in the 1952 convention, both in size and geographic distribution. As a southern Indiana candidate Craig had received his heaviest support at the state convention from the southern delegations. In the state committee Craig's position was almost reversed; his supporters there were Leland Smith in the Second District, Harry Essex in the Fourth, and John Lauer in the Sixth—all from central or northern congressional districts. George Chambers in the Fifth District was also reported to have voted to retain Wright as chairman, but principally because of common hometown ties. Russell Robbins in the Tenth District—east-central Indiana—had also supported Wright, but sought publicly to maintain a position between the two factions; his vice-chairman, Mrs. Whitehead, was clearly allied with the Senators and had been chosen as vice-chairman by them. The Republican congressman from Robbins' district, Ralph Harvey, was also allied with Capehart and Jenner and was indeed the only member of the House delegation to commit himself openly to their support. All the rest of the district chairmen were aligned against Craig. Craig's task was to hold on to the votes he had and add enough others to make the 12 needed for a majority on the 22 member state committee.

To accomplish this purpose Craig employed two principal strategies. The first consisted of an effort to capitalize on his own personal popularity by a speaking tour across the state. His addresses were sponsored by the supposedly non-factional Republican Veterans of Indiana—whose chairman by an interesting coincidence was Fred C. Tucker, Jr., the chairman also of the Indiana Committee for Republican Victory—and his campaign was billed as a “Harmony Caravan.” The intention clearly, however, was to line up additional precinct committeemen, county chairmen, and district chairmen through a demonstration of the governor's popular following.

### THE GOVERNOR'S CHIEF WEAPON

Yet the governor's chief weapon was not oratory, but patronage. Craig possessed complete control of the assignment of the license bureaus throughout the state as well as other prerequisites, and his second strategy was to use these powers freely to bring pressure upon recalcitrant party workers.

Some of the district chairmen who had voted against Craig in the state committee were still receiving patronage from the state, and many of their county chairmen were subject to influence through threats to transfer license bureaus

and the like. Where the regular organization had already been by-passed, Craig could not punish any one by taking away jobs, or influence any one by threatening to take away jobs, but he could and did use patronage to line up backing for an attempt to elect a new chairman.

### SLATING CONTESTS

Such an effort began with the formation of slates of precinct committeemen from state job-holders and such volunteers as were available. Fights in the precincts between the two factions did not take place in all counties, or in all precincts within the counties contested, but at the height of the struggle Sayer, Craig's patronage assistant, listed 27 counties out of 92 in the state in which the governor and the Senators were battling for control.\* Sayer commented that the chairmen in the other 65 counties, while not all for Craig, were at least "fair" and "open-minded" (or, though Sayer did not say it, too well entrenched to be dislodged). There were no contests named in the Second District, represented on the state committee by Leland Smith.

One of the most important of the county contests was that in Marion County which itself makes up the Eleventh Congressional District. This county is the largest in the state and plays a key role in party politics. Because it is the residence of most Statehouse employees, the influence of patronage is particularly strong. The county chairman was an ally of the Senators and the district committeeman had voted against Wright for state chairman. Craig's fight to unseat both was led by H. Dale Brown, Marion County clerk.

The regulars struck back directly at Brown by slating Stephen C. Noland, editor of the *Marion County Mail* and former editor of the *Indianapolis News*, as a Republican primary candidate for county clerk. By defeating Brown in the primary the regular organization hoped to discredit him politically. Brown replied by setting up a Republican Candidates Committee which also endorsed a complete slate of candidates in the primary. Both factions endorsed most incumbents for reelection to office, but the slates listed opposing candidates for county clerk, county commissioners, one judgeship, state senator, and state representatives. The regular Republican committee sought to endorse Charles Brownson for reelection to Congress, but Brownson declined to give the necessary statement of consent, out of loyalty to Brown. Under the strict Indiana laws on slating, this prevented the regular organization from distributing lists of candidates including his name.

Other primary contests elsewhere in the state were also influenced by the factional struggle. In the Ninth District the attempt to unseat Representative Earl Wilson in the primary took on the color of a Craig-Capehart duel. The district chairman, Ivan H. (Jack) Morgan, a Capehart ally, opposed Wilson with a candidate generally believed to have the moral support of Senator Jen-

\* These were: First District, Lake County; Third District, Elkhart, Marshall, LaPorte, and St. Joseph; Fourth District, Allen and Lagrange; Fifth District, Huntington; Sixth District, Warren and Vigo; Seventh District, Greene, Sullivan, Gibson, Knox, Daviess, and Monroe; Eighth District, Warrick, Posey, Crawford, and Clark; Ninth District, Scott and Jefferson; Tenth District, Hancock, Wayne, Fayette, and Shelby; and Eleventh District, Marion.

ner, who lived within the district. Anonymous letters were circulated through Union, Decatur, Franklin, and Bartholomew counties in the east-central section of the state, where State Senator Milford E. Anness was engaged in a primary contest, calling Anness a stooge for Craig and Sherwood. Numerous other legislative primary campaigns also turned upon the issue of support of Craig's programs in the legislature.

The factional battle affected some contests over nominations in the primaries, but the heart of the fight remained the struggle for the state committee. In the closing stages of the campaign some party leaders professed to fear that the party itself might be torn apart in the process. A woman worker for the Republican party swore out an affidavit asserting that Craig had told her: "It is not the wreck [of the party] that I am concerned with. I am only concerned with who will control the wreckage." Craig called the statement a lie, but many observers believed the winner of the battle would win control only of wreckage, while the Capehart-Jenner group made noisy use of the affidavit.

Senator Jenner had remained relatively aloof from the contest; shortly before the primary, however, on April 24, he and Senator Capehart held a joint press conference in the Claypool Hotel to issue a statement supporting the regular Republican organization against what they described as a "rebel organization," Craig's Indiana Committee for Republican Victory. In a television speech the night before the election, Craig replied by declaring that the factional fight was caused by "members of the party who do not believe in President Eisenhower's work." He added: "That's where we fell out, and that's what's behind the present political squabble." Capehart described the charge as "silly and ridiculous" and asserted: "I'm behind President Eisenhower 100 percent." Thus the pre-primary stage of the campaign ended.

## THE PRIMARY

The primary election was held May 4. At the request of Representative Brownson a federal investigator was brought to Marion County to police the proceedings, but found no irregularities. The chief effect of the move seemed to be to minimize the number of "jammed" voting machines, the custom having been to open numerous machines on the plea they were jammed and thus obtain a preview of the vote. There were no particular disturbances on election day, although police were ordered to one near North Side precinct in Indianapolis when the whole election board was accused of drinking on duty. A deputy election commissioner was quoted: "I hate to say this, but they are pretty well looped," but no factional significance was attributed to the incident. In several counties the minority faction made use of a provision of the Indiana election law permitting any group of 26 percent or more of the candidates for nomination, or of 26 percent or more of the candidates for committeeman to combine and, by petition, place watchers at designated polling places.

Some results were apparent when the count began. In Marion County Craig's allies scored a substantial victory. Brown was almost beaten for county clerk, but eventually won by a margin of less than a thousand votes. The rest of his slate, with only four minor exceptions, was successful. One of the Marion incumbents defeated was Senator Hoyt Moore, among Craig's most vocal op-

ponents during the 1953 legislative session. Another anti-Craig senator, Samuel E. Johnson of Anderson, also was eliminated in the primary. In the Ninth District Earl Wilson held on to his congressional seat handily, despite District Chairman Morgan and the loud opposition of the *Indianapolis Star*. On the other hand, Craig's floor leader in the 1953 state House of Representatives, Norman J. Neely, was beaten in the Monroe County primary. Succeeding days disclosed that the successful party nominees for the legislature divided about 50-50 between the pro-Craig and anti-Craig factions.

The effect of the primary voting upon the more important contest for control of the party machinery was less immediately apparent. In some counties a decision had been reached—Monroe, where Craig carried only six of twenty-six precincts against Chairman Fritz Ryan or Daviess, where his candidates won only two of thirty-three were examples—but the decision still rested with counties in which both sides claimed victory or in which a majority of the committeemen were still uncommitted.

### POST-ELECTION REORGANIZATION

The payoff was to come on the Saturday following the primary, the day set in the election law for party reorganization, i.e., the election of county officers by the county committees. Both factions worked furiously to line up votes. Capehart and Jenner sought to hold their lines firm in a flurry of conferences. Unfortunately for the Senators, a key vote in the United States Senate, that on a motion to send President Eisenhower's Taft-Hartley amendment bill back to committee, was taken at this time. Before the vote Senate Labor Committee Chairman H. Alexander Smith (Rep., N.J.) said: "We're not licked yet. Some Democrats are going to vote against recommittal. But, unfortunately, some of our boys are away." Only two Senators missed the final vote, Capehart and Jenner, but their absences just missed being decisive.

Immediately after the primary, Governor Craig hurried to his former home in the Seventh District to assume personal command of the drive for votes there. Both factions concentrated on the effort to swing the three southern districts, the Seventh, the Eighth, and the Ninth. All three had been allied with Capehart on the old committee; Craig was seeking to win all three. Furious protests were lodged by the district chairmen, who complained of attempts to use patronage to win away their precinct committeemen. Bruce Kixmiller charged that "luscious plums" of patronage were being offered to his workers in the Seventh, while Ivan Morgan in the Ninth sent telegrams to his precinct leaders in the fourteen counties of his district calling their attention to a 1945 law making it a felony either to offer a bribe or to make a threat to procure "election to any office under the laws of this state." Morgan told newsmen: "They've promised one county enough new bridges to use up the state's entire bridge funds for next year. They have promised five different cities on the Ohio and Wabash rivers that the proposed Chicago-Miami superhighway will pass through them—making it a five pronged road," and declaimed: "They are using persuasion, blackmail, and every other trick. All we have to operate with is our integrity and our honor."

A similar complaint came from the First District where District Chairman

Vernon Anderson was backing Dr. Philip Rosenbloom for county chairman. Dr. Rosenbloom was one of a handful who had supported Eisenhower in 1952, but by this time was allied with the Senators. Anderson accused Craig of trying to win over precinct committeemen through bribery and intimidation, charging that at least one committeeman had been offered a \$6,000 a year state job if he would give his proxy to the governor's forces. A reply from Sayer called the vote-buying charges "too ridiculous even to comment on."

The contest in Marion County had been settled on primary day. The day after the primary Governor Craig claimed that his group had won 94 of the 126 contests for precinct committeeman. (Despite the vigor of the rivalry, less than half the precincts had been contested.) Before the primary the Capehart-Jenner county chairman had announced his intention to retire. His anticipated successor, George K. Johnson, Center Township trustee, now withdrew from the race. Frank J. Unversaw, the county surveyor, promptly declared for the office as a "compromise" candidate and was as promptly endorsed by Senators Jenner and Capehart in a "harmony and unity" move. But the majority held by Brown appeared to be clearcut. Control of Marion County gave Craig control of the Eleventh District and two more votes on the state committee. To elect a new state chairman, however, he needed at least two more votes and had to hold on to every district that had supported him in January.

### COUNTY REORGANIZATION MEETINGS

County reorganization meetings were held at 1 P.M., Saturday, May 8. As expected, the Craig group controlled the Marion County party reorganization. The test vote between the two factions came on two election-day tie votes for precinct committeemen. In each case the Brown candidate was seated by the county committee, 510 to 325. Brown's nominee was then elected county chairman over Unversaw, 553 to 290, and immediately announced his intention of appointing H. Dale Brown as district chairman. In the First District, however, Dr. Philip Rosenbloom, Capehart's candidate, won 352 to 184, and indicated that he would reappoint Vernon Anderson to the state committee.

The results in Marion and Lake counties produced a stand-off, with two state committee votes going to each side. But Craig's efforts to pick up additional votes were concentrated in the southern districts. Of the 27 counties Sayer had indentified as contested, 6 were in the Seventh District, 4 in the Eighth, and 2 in the Ninth. From county to county the pattern was much the same. Where the county chairman was a regular he was opposed by a Craig ticket, usually headed by the license bureau manager for the county or some other high state appointee, and supported by the lesser state employees in the county and the governor's other friends. The Seventh can be taken as an example.

This was the scene of some of the bitterest fighting as Craig personally led the effort to unseat Capehart's district chairman in Capehart's home district. The district was close and Capehart had won the special election late in 1953 only by 12 votes to 10. In Monroe and Daviess counties Craig's efforts had already fizzled in the primary. Monroe County Chairman Fritz Ryan had earlier been offered a choice between: 1) getting out of politics and holding on

to his license bureau, or 2) remaining county chairman and losing it. When Ryan chose to keep the county chairmanship, Craig backed a candidate, Lloyd Griffin, against him, but Griffin lost his own precinct and carried only six others. In Capehart's home county, Daviess, the Craig forces did even worse, winning only two precincts.

In Knox County the fight was closer, but again Capehart won. Kixmiller, the district chairman and former county chairman, did not run for reelection to the county post but designated Dean Atkinson as his successor. The primary election had given Kixmiller 27 slated precinct committeemen against 17 for Craig with 13 unopposed committeemen holding the balance. On a secret ballot in a quiet meeting Atkinson won, 60 to 52.

Kixmiller's man won also in Martin County where Hugh Gray was returned, but the meeting there could not be called quiet. The Craig forces threatened to contest at the district level the Martin County election. They charged that Hugh Gray, the chairman of the meeting, refused to let the Craig leaders introduce their candidates, declined to appoint a temporary chairman, nominated himself, closed the nominations, called for a voice vote, declared himself elected, and left so hurriedly that he forgot his hat.

In Gibson County the Capehart forces won yet again when the county chairman was reelected, 43 to 27, over the manager of the Gibson County Motor Vehicle Bureau. But the crucial break came in the Greene County reorganization. There Jack McIntyre, a former state commander of the American Legion, allied with the governor, succeeded Mayor Robert McFadden of Linton as county chairman. With only one county as the margin of difference this change meant that the Seventh District would elect a Craig state committeeman.

It appeared that the Eighth District would do the same. Fred Malotte, the Eighth District chairman, was still receiving patronage at the time he voted against the governor on the Wright removal, and several of his county chairmen were on the state payroll and subject to Craig pressure. Additional patronage—and influence—was supplied by the Toll Road Commission. In May of 1954 bonds had already been sold to finance a \$282,000,000 toll road across northern Indiana, and at the time of the primary fight the Toll Road Commission was hurrying to sell bonds for a north-south extension that would cost a half billion more. Charles B. Enlow, vice-chairman of the Toll Road Commission, and Albert Wedeking, its executive director as well as state highway commission chairman, both lived in the Eighth District. The anti-Craig wing charged that promises regarding the future construction of toll road facilities were freely used to influence the county voting. Whatever the cause, the Craig forces claimed to have secured a majority of the county chairmen in the Eighth.

### A CRITICAL MEETING

The most critical—and the noisiest—of the reorganization meetings in this district was that held in Vanderburgh County, which includes Evansville. J. Ervin Taylor, the incumbent county chairman and manager of the county license bureau, was opposed by a factional group called the Republicans for Good Government. Although the county split was based upon local issues

rather than the statewide contest, the two became entangled because Taylor was one of Craig's chief leaders in the Eighth Congressional District.

The Taylor Republican organization had displayed its helplessness in the primary; even the few candidates it slated and succeeded in nominating joined in urging that Taylor be pushed out. However, Mayor H. O. Roberts of Evansville had committed himself to Governor Craig to deliver an anti-Malotte county chairman and threw in with Taylor. When questioned by reporters as to his role in the factional fight, Roberts acknowledged: "I know this may be political suicide, but I am going to go ahead for the balance of my administration doing the best job I can for the city of Evansville." The mayor pointed out that he still had a year and eight months to serve in office and could make up for any unpopularity suffered through supporting Taylor during that time. He argued that by aligning himself with Craig against Capehart and Jenner he had been able to get many things for Evansville, and demanded: "Why can't the people see that?" The report in the *Evansville Courier* of the mayor's press conference noted that Roberts referred presumably to an acquisition of land from the Evansville State Hospital for a sports center, action by the Indiana highway department on a West Side expressway, and the promise of positive action on a long sought bridge over the Wabash River at Mt. Vernon.

In a final burst of oratorical justification, Roberts explained:

Being mayor is comparable to being captain of a ship. The captain must chart the course. He must guide the ship safely through troubled waters and storms, as well as through smooth seas when the sailing is easy. He must look out for enemies who would scuttle the ship. He is responsible for all the passengers on board the ship and must see that they arrive well and happy at their destination. He must pick a loyal crew to assist him in all these matters. As Skipper of the Good Ship Evansville, I can proudly claim that I have not veered from the charted course. We have not lost sight of the ultimate goal, though beset at times by trials and tribulations. The log and record of the ship will prove, to all who care to look, that the ship is making steady progress forward and is in no danger of capsizing.

Although the insurgent Republicans for Good Government had succeeded in electing a majority of its primary candidates for county office, it was unable to control a majority of the precinct committeemen. Mayor Roberts disclaimed any intention of seeking to influence those employees of the city government who were also members of the county committee, but the effect of his statement was the same. The Good Government leaders tape-recorded the meeting at which Taylor was reelected, claimed they could prove twelve violations of required procedure, and threatened to contest Taylor's election; but the victory was Craig's.

### INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS?

The governor's forces also claimed to have carried the Ninth District. Here, the county chairman, G. T. Fleming-Roberts, a mystery story writer, was affiliated with the state committee faction. Craig men accused him of calling the meeting to order five minutes before the legally appointed time, accepting

only his own nomination, gaveling it through, and then adjourning the meeting. As he left the meeting place there was shoving and jostling, Mrs. Fleming-Roberts was knocked to the ground, and a tear gas bomb was exploded outside the door. After this episode the Craig forces resumed the meeting with the previous year's vice-chairman presiding, and elected another slate of officers.

In the Tenth District an effort by the senatorial allies to unseat the Wayne County chairman in order to get at District Chairman Russell Robbins was turned back; Robbins, once a fence-sitter, was now definitely in Craig's camp. Elsewhere the results were less satisfactory to the governor. The Third went definitely against Craig. The governor's forces had hoped to make Tom Bath district chairman if they could obtain a majority in the four-county district; they did no more than hold on to the one county they had, Bath's own St. Joseph. And in the Fourth District an effort to oust the anti-Craig chairman in Allen County also failed.

Though disappointing, these failures seemed unimportant, for the Craig forces were claiming victory on the basis of the county reorganization meetings. Asserting that he spoke for the governor, State Senator Roy Conrad predicted a 17 to 5 Craig majority on the next state committee, conceding only the First and the Third Districts to the Senators and assuming the reelection of both pro-Craig Chairman Robbins and anti-Craig Vice Chairman Mrs. Whitehead in the Tenth. The governor's advisers asserted that they had held on to the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Districts, had captured the Seventh with the election of McIntyre in Greene County, and had picked up enough county chairmen to oust the district leaders in the Eighth and Ninth. Victory had been won in the south.

The Senators, however, declined to concede and State Chairman Cyr called the results "inconclusive." Senator Capehart pointed out that in the event of an 11 to 11 tie, the state chairman could cast the deciding vote for himself, while Senator Jenner commented: "You can't tell. Win or lose, it's a political miracle—loyalty against power, patronage, and money."

## MIRACLES ARE MADE

Compared to the state patronage at the disposal of the governor, the federal patronage distributed by the Senators was puny. But they retained one powerful weapon. Two additional federal judgeships had been created for Indiana, one in the north and one in the south. Neither had yet been filled. This was not the sort of patronage that could be used to line up precinct committeemen, but the posts were prizes that might cause a covetous district chairman to switch sides. This was a danger against which the governor still needed to guard himself.

Although he claimed victory, Craig continued to prepare for the district meetings scheduled for Tuesday, May 11. On Sunday he traveled to Santa Claus, Indiana, to confer with his leaders in the Eighth District. Ervin Taylor served as chairman of the caucus. Craig, Sayer, and State Highway Chairman Wedeking were present, as were 19 of the 22 members of the district commit-

tee. An agreement was reached to back the Perry County chairman for district chairman against Malotte, and all 19 chairmen and vice-chairmen present pledged their votes to him. The following day Craig continued his efforts to shore up the Eighth District. In January the Warrick County license bureau had been taken from one of the appointees of the county chairman and given to a member of the opposition Progressive faction. The Progressives, however, elected only three precinct committeemen. The county chairman began to lean toward Capehart. The Monday morning before the district meetings auditors from the State Motor Vehicle Bureau arrived to tell the Warrick County manager his bureau was being transferred back to its previous operator.

In the final maneuvering for position the Craig forces now charged discrimination by the state headquarters in the selection of sites for the district meetings, alleging that the conventions in the Seventh and in the Tenth had been placed at Bloomington and Richmond respectively to capitalize on pro-Capehart sentiment there. Locating the Ninth District meeting, which was to witness the effort to unseat Chairman Ivan Morgan, at the Morgan Packing Company offices in Austin also elicited wry comment.

### DISTRICT COMMITTEE ELECTIONS

On Tuesday the district committees met in convention. The First and Eleventh District meetings were perfunctory as Vernon Anderson and H. Dale Brown were appointed to the state committee by the Lake and Marion County chairmen. In the Third District Kenneth D. Osborn, allied with the Senators, stepped aside and was replaced by Charles Ainlay, of similar sentiments. Together with the selection of vice-chairmen, this left the score: CRAIG, 2; SENATORS, 4.

The elections in the three southern districts also went as expected, though not quite as smoothly as Craig had hoped. As anticipated, Craig won in the Seventh District. The meeting was held in the courtroom of the Monroe County Circuit Court at Bloomington. Craig appeared on the scene in person and lunched with his factional leaders before the balloting. The division between the factions was close, the courtroom was packed, and at one point District Chairman Kixmiller threatened to clear the room when the excitement became intense. It took two hours to select a chairman; Johnson County Chairman Wayne Kellams defeated Kixmiller, 12 to 10. A vice-chairman, also for Craig, was then elected in six minutes on a standing roll-call vote.

Governor Craig won out also in the Eighth District, but not as easily as predicted. Craig had obtained pledges of support from 19 of the 22 members of the district committee before the meeting began. Fred Malotte, district chairman for nine years, transformed the situation by the simple expedient of ordering a secret ballot. (Malotte told reporters later: "They had been pressuring those people and I knew if it were an open ballot, I wouldn't receive more than two or three votes.") He then turned the meeting over to Clark Dellinger, one of the few open allies of the Senators. Maurice Reed, Craig's candidate, was elected over Malotte, but only by a 12 to 10 vote. The Jenner-Capehart forces made no effort to contest the other district offices.

In the Ninth District Craig and Representative Wilson joined forces to support Wilbur Bannister, Jennings County chairman, against their mutual enemy, District Chairman Morgan, whose family had controlled the office for twenty years. Bannister won out at the district meeting, 16 to 12. The Tenth District, as expected, divided between the factions. Chairman Russell Robbins, counted definitely for Craig, was opposed by Henry County Chairman Clem Conway, but defeated him. His vice-chairman, Mrs. Whitehead, allied with the Senators, was reelected unanimously. Score: CRAIG, 9; SENATORS, 5.

### THE NORTHERN DISTRICTS

In the north, the governor's plans seemed to go awry. The Fourth District meeting, held at the Van Orman Hotel in Fort Wayne, witnessed a battle royal between the factions. The state committee forces charged that the Noble County vice-chairman, a Noble County Welfare Department employee, was purposely summoned to a state welfare meeting in Indianapolis so that her vote could not be tallied. Her proxy was obtained when she arrived in Indianapolis and flown personally by Paul Cyr to Fort Wayne. The first ballot showed an 8 to 8 tie between the factions. The meeting was closed to all except the 16 committee members, but National Committeeman Ralph Gates, whose home is within the district, was in frequent conference with the senatorial followers as to the strategy to be employed. His son, Robert Gates, voted the proxy of the Whitley County vice-chairman. On the 5th ballot Roy Jones, Lagrange County chairman, defeated the incumbent chairman, Harry Essex, one of Craig's supporters on the state committee and a member, by Craig's appointment, of the State Highway Commission. Jones was aligned with the state committee. The voting for vice-chairman repeated the 8 to 8 deadlock; the Craig candidate was Mrs. Mabel Lyons, former state vice-chairman with Noland Wright. When the 12th ballot continued the tie, the district committee voted to certify the deadlock to the state committee for decision. After a hurried telephone conversation with Republican state headquarters, the Capehart forces moved that the motion to certify be reconsidered. The balloting was resumed and on the 32nd ballot Mrs. Lyons was defeated by Mrs. Emmet Hall, also allied with Capehart, Jenner, and Gates. The vote was 9 to 7.

The election in the Fifth District was also close. Efforts to pressure and cajole county chairmen continued through the night and up to voting time. At the meeting in the Spencer Hotel at Marion, District Chairman George Chambers was reelected 11 to 9, edging out Craig's candidate, Thomas T. Robison, a Public Service Commission lawyer. Only in the Sixth District did the governor hold his ground when incumbent John Lauer was reelected as district chairman without opposition. Score: CRAIG, 11; SENATORS, 9.

### SOMETHING NEW IN POLITICS

The biggest surprise in the voting, however, came in the Second District. Leland Smith, counted as a Craig ally and widely mentioned for state chairman, was defeated by a previously obscure county chairman, Al Cast of New-

ton County. The vote at the district meeting in the Pulaski County Courthouse at Winamac went 14 to 10 for Cast. Mrs. Ione Harrington, manager of the Dunes Park motor vehicle bureau, was then reelected vice-chairman. When news of the result reached state headquarters Senator Jenner announced triumphantly: "That is where Leland Smith goes out of politics," and the Senators claimed both votes on the state committee.

A period of confusion followed. Members of the Capehart-Jenner faction pointed to the fact that Cast, county chairman for four years, was a protege of Ira Dixon, former Second District chairman, also from Newton County, that Dixon was now a staff member of Capehart's Senate Banking and Currency committee, and claimed Cast would support the Senators on the state committee. They also claimed the vote of the Second District vice-chairman despite the fact that she was a state employee. After eight of the district elections had been reported, Senator Capehart claimed a 10 to 6 lead. When all 11 district results were known, the Senators announced that an 11 to 11 split on the state committee would permit Paul Cyr to break the tie and vote himself back into office.

On the basis of the same returns the Craig forces claimed a 15 to 7 majority. There was no question that Craig had swept the three southern districts, the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth, taking all three away from the Senators. He was also conceded to have won the chairmen and vice-chairmen in the Sixth and Eleventh, and the chairman in the Tenth. Craig's men in turn conceded to the Senators the First, Third, and Fifth Districts, and the vice-chairman in the Tenth (although a still more enthusiastic member of the Craig crew predicted a one-to-one split between the factions in the Third). But in the Second and the Fourth Districts where Craig chairmen had been beaten, Sayer insisted: "We had two groups of candidates in both districts and we were going to win either way." Both sides claimed the four votes on which the state committee majority would depend.

About midnight the Senators learned the bitter truth. Al Cast had been elected to the state committee through the support of Representative Charles Halleck and not only would vote with Craig on the committee, but was Craig's choice for state chairman. The two Senators prepared a joint statement. While Republican State Secretary Herb Hill distributed copies to reporters at state headquarters, identical telegrams were sent to newspapers throughout the state:

WE HAVE NEVER SEEN ANYTHING LIKE THIS IN THE HISTORY OF INDIANA POLITICS. IT WAS INTEGRITY AND LOYALTY TO THE HIGH PRINCIPLES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY VERSUS CORRUPTION BRIBERY THREATS COERCION AND INTIMIDATION. SINCE SO MANY FINE LOYAL PEOPLE HAVE STOOD UP IN THIS VERY CLOSE CONTEST WE SEE NO FURTHER GOOD TO BE GAINED BY HAVING THESE WONDERFUL PEOPLE FURTHER THREATENED COERCED INTIMIDATED BROW-BEATEN AND TORTURED. THEREFORE WE ARE RECOMMENDING TO ALL OF OUR LOYAL FRIENDS THAT THE REPUBLICAN BANNER IN INDIANA FLY UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF GEORGE CRAIG, DALE BROWN, ROY CONRAD, ALBERT WEDGEKING, FRANK MILLIS, AND LITTLE DOC SHERWOOD AND MEN OF THEIR ILK. THIS STATEMENT IS ISSUED AT THIS TIME BECAUSE WE NOW KNOW THAT AL

CAST THE NEW SECOND DISTRICT CHAIRMAN IS PART OF THE CRAIG MACHINE. GOVERNOR CRAIG'S WISHES TO QUOTE CONTROL THE WRECKAGE UNQUOTE ARE NOW GRANTED. WE STAND NOW AS ALWAYS READY TO WORK FOR AND WITH ALL LOYAL REPUBLICANS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE PARTY AND THE GOOD OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

HOMER E. CAPEHART AND WILLIAM E. JENNER

### CRAIG TAKES OVER

The election of a state chairman was an anti-climax. Governor Craig told reporters seeking a reply to the Senators' statement: "I have nothing to say at all." Paul Cyr and Mrs. Whitehead announced they would not be candidates for reelection as the "party now is controlled by Governor Craig." To offset the vitriolic statement by the Senators the Indiana Republican House delegation met at Washington in the office of House Majority Leader Halleck and adopted a statement praising Al Cast, the slated "compromise" candidate for state chairman. It was given to the press with instructions to "hold for release until Mr. Cast is elected."

The state committee met Wednesday, May 12. Paul Cyr called the meeting to order, made a brief speech, commented that it had been a "rough battle and I enjoyed it," and turned the gavel over to Mrs. Whitehead as the committee went into executive session. Outside, Cyr told waiting newsmen: "Al Cast is not our district chairman. If elected, this will be a victory for Charles Halleck and George Craig. He certainly is not our compromise candidate." Inside the meeting a complete set of Craig candidates was put through, for chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, and treasurer. There was no opposition. The state committee then appointed a committee, composed of Cast, Brown, and Robbins, to investigate the disputed county reorganization meetings in Brown, Martin, and Bartholomew.

Al Cast, the third state chairman in three months, promptly promised there would be no more by-passing, that all future patronage would be cleared through party organization channels. Sayer echoed his words for Governor Craig, declaring: "We have won. We are not mad at anybody . . . we want to let bygones be bygones." (Craig later clarified Cast's promise, indicating it applied only to future patronage and would not be applied retroactively to appointments already made.) Not everyone took the war's end seriously. During the night someone entered the offices of the state committee and jumbled the mailing lists to destroy their usefulness. The new state secretary reported that thousands of addressograph plates had been "hopelessly scrambled" and said he was calling in locksmiths to replace all locks in the party headquarters on the ninth floor of the Claypool.

The annual meeting of the Indiana Republican Editorial Association, an association of editors of Republican newspapers throughout the state, was held the following weekend at French Lick. Most of the state party leaders were present and appeals were made for harmony and unity. A speech by Senator Capehart to the editors provoked a flurry of speculation that he would retire at the end of his term in 1956; a few days later, on May 19, Capehart took the

unusual step of announcing he would seek renomination and reelection in two years. But the most pressing and immediate question concerned the forthcoming 1954 Republican state convention, whether Craig would seek to prevent the renomination of the incumbent state officers who had lined up against him.

### HARMONY PREVAILS

Early in the struggle H. Dale Brown had promised that no attempt would be made to deny incumbent office-holders their customary second term and relatively few counties had witnessed large-scale contests for state convention delegates. However, another Craig ally, State Senator Roy Conrad, had predicted that a complete slate of Craig-approved candidates would be offered at the convention. Mayor H. O. Roberts of Evansville told reporters he had been approached by the Craig forces as a possible candidate for secretary of state against Crawford F. Parker. Rumors circulated also that the governor's men would oppose Superintendent of Public Instruction Wilbur Young, who had been engaged for some time in a running feud with Robert Wyatt of the powerful Indiana State Teachers' Association.

Neither contest actually developed at the convention. No effort was made by Craig to disturb the tradition of giving a two-year term officeholder an automatic second term. In a harmony gesture the party platform praised the administration of Governor Craig while lauding Senators Capehart and Jenner, as well as the Republican congressional delegation, for their support of President Eisenhower's program. There were only two contests for minor offices.

A few odds and ends remained to be disposed of before the 1954 organization fight could be pronounced over. Later in June the Republican state committee decided that no lawful election of party officials had ever been held in Brown County and directed State Chairman Cast to supervise a new election. At the same time the committee ruled that Hugh Gray had been legally elected county chairman in Martin County, though the committee censured the procedure employed in the reorganization. A complaint regarding the election in Bartholomew County had previously been withdrawn.

The other remaining piece of party business was the appointment of two federal judges for Indiana. Craig's sweep of the southern congressional districts had eliminated a number of candidates for the vacancy in that area and late in May it became known that Senators Capehart and Jenner had endorsed their long-time political friend, Cale Holder of Indianapolis, for the post. After further delay a nominee was chosen for the northern district, Judge Lynn Parkinson of Lafayette. Parkinson was Representative Halleck's candidate for the position and it was a dispute over this judgeship that had brought about the surprise defeat of Leland Smith as Second District chairman. When Smith opposed Parkinson's nomination and sought the job for himself, Halleck used his influence to replace Smith with a more amenable district chairman, Cast. The nominations of Holder and Parkinson were submitted by the President and approved by the Senate. With the completion of these appointments the conflict precipitated by the removal of Wright as chairman came to a close.

There was no guarantee that the struggle between the Senators and the governor would not be resumed in the near future, but when hostilities recommenced they would probably belong in a new round of the fist fight.

## CONCLUSION

What is the significance of this tale of the machinations and manuevers that brought victory for Governor Craig in the 1954 struggle for control of the Republican party? After the war was over, the *Louisville Courier-Journal* commented philosophically:

The unique quality of Indiana politics, particularly on the Republican side, was never better shown than in the victory of Governor Craig over the Capehart-Jenner combination. To a larger extent than in most states, selection of those who will run for high office there—Senator and Governor—is remote from the people and in the hands of "the organization."

Thus he who builds a better organization has a ready-made path to his door. The long and short of it, as of today, is that Governor Craig did an unexpectedly good job of building. He had more tools than his rivals thought.

Several years ago, in *Inside U.S.A.*, John Gunther put it this way: "Indiana is one of the most 'professional' states in the Union politically." It is a community, he added, ruled by patronage. Party allegiance is one thing, and it is quite solid. Factional allegiance, however, is fluid and volatile. . . .

In a way, then, the Craig victory is not only a story of Hoosier political techniques. It also points a moral in American politics; namely, that political organizations, built on power and favors, hold within themselves the seeds of their own disintegration. The soil in which they grow is always fallow for resentments and reprisals. To challenge them there is always a fresh crop of the ambitious and the energetic, so that nothing stays the same. The ferment never ceases.

Undeniably, patronage was the focus of the fight within the Indiana Republican party. The decisive switch came in the southern districts: the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth. All three were for Capehart and Jenner in January; in May all three were aligned with Craig. (Curiously, all three of the principals in the dispute, Craig, Capehart, and Jenner, counted this section of Indiana as their home.) These were also among the three districts most susceptible to the influence of state patronage. Party machines in the poor farm lands of southern Indiana are oiled by patronage far more than their counterparts in the more prosperous rural north and the industrial urban areas. Precinct committeemen hold jobs on the state highways or in the state parks; county chairmen hold supervisory positions on the highways or in the parks or operate license bureaus. When Craig cracked the patronage whip, all three districts responded. He carried these areas while he was losing in the north.

It would be possible, of course, to overstate the importance of the patronage motivation in the 1954 fight. Some of the supporters of the two Senators, no doubt, calculated that Jenner and Capehart would sooner or later be the winners in the intra-party struggle and that the eventual material rewards would be greater on that side of the fence. Many others were attached to the Capehart-

Jenner alliance out of personal loyalty or emotional dedication to the cause of Taft Republicanism. Something of the same could be said of Craig's following; in part this consisted of his Legion friends, in part of persons who saw in Craig an image of a more liberal and (to them) more desirable Republicanism.

Yet the dynamic element in intra-party politicking in Indiana was not issues or ideology, but patronage. The basis of the conflict between the Senators and the governor was an argument over who should control the patronage. The stakes of the conflict were who should control the patronage in the future. The winner in the conflict was determined by who controlled the most patronage at the time. In sum the contest was over who should hand out the jobs and who should receive them. Is this kind of conflict healthy for a party? Editorially, the *Indianapolis Star* professed to find it so:

Party controversy is the life of the party, not its death. Americans need not worry about factionalism endangering political liberty. Only when parties become highly disciplined, machine controlled organizations that enforce conformity and permit no dissent, will American democracy be endangered. Our Indiana primaries proved again that party politics in Indiana is still healthy, strong and responsive to the will of the people.





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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Frank J. Munger is associate professor at the Maxwell Graduate School, Syracuse University. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1956 and, with V. O. Key, Jr., is the author of "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: The Case of Indiana," in: Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959).

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